

12 February 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Additional Information Requested by
Mr. Mahon for Inclusion in the Record
of the Hearings for 5 and 6 February 1963

1. Purpose of the Soviet Space Effort

a. We have not yet detected or identified any Soviet military space program.

b. We believe, however, that the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. We believe the USSR will produce and deploy those military space systems which are feasible and advantageous in comparison with other types of weapons and military equipment. The first Soviet military space vehicles are likely to be earth satellites used in support roles such as reconnaissance, early warning, weather surveillance, communications, and navigation.

c. We do not believe that the Soviets have yet launched such vehicles for military purposes. However, the recovered satellites in the "COSMOS" series probably accomplished cloud photography and could have performed experiments involving photographic, electronic and nuclear reconnaissance.

d. We do not believe that Soviet space technology has progressed sufficiently for the Soviets to have made the decision to proceed with large scale programs for offensive or defensive space weapons. Within this decade an orbital bombardment system almost certainly will not compare favorably with ICBMs as a military system.

2. Antisubmarine Weapons Systems

a. Killer submarines

1) The USSR has an urgent requirement for high performance ASW submarines as a partial countermeasure to the US Polaris fleet. The Soviets have three classes of submarines, the nuclear N and the conventional F, and R, with characteristics that make them suitable for use in antisubmarine warfare (ASW).

2) The N-class nuclear-propelled torpedo-attack submarine may have a maximum speed of 20-22 knots. It appears to be well equipped with sonar, and probably carries 24 torpedoes. About seven N-class ships are in operation, all in the Northern Fleet. The conventionally powered F- and R-class submarines are also well equipped with sonar installations but have much less range and speed, particularly underwater. They would therefore pose only a limited threat to Polaris submarines. Twenty-five F-class units and 20-25 R-class units are operational.

3) Although these are the best equipped of known Soviet submarines to carry out ASW, there is only slight evidence that they have been given this as their primary mission.

██████████ during hostilities most conventionally armed Soviet submarines would take up defensive stations along broad barriers at some distance from the Soviet coasts. Their objective would be to attack any targets that approached their positions, whether surface vessels or submarines.

b. Air-launched Antisubmarine Weapons

1) There is no evidence that the Soviets have developed an air-to-surface missile (ASM) designed for use against submarines.

2) The Soviet Naval Air Force has some 260 Badger (TU-16) jet medium bombers which are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles (ASM). Most of these ASMs are Kipper (AS-2) cruise types with a range of 100 nautical miles (n.m.) although some of the older and less sophisticated Kennels (AS-1) which have a range of 55 n.m. are still in service. These ASMs

would be employed against sharply defined radar targets such as aircraft carriers. They might have some marginal effectiveness against a surfaced submarine at short ranges. They have no capability against a submerged submarine.

3) The Soviets may have developed air-dropped torpedoes and nuclear depth bombs for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) use. The effectiveness of these weapons would, however, depend on the Soviet's ability to detect the submarines. Although ASW is a major concern of the Soviet Navy, the development of an air potential in this field generally has been hindered by deficiencies not only in the number and type of aircraft employed but also in detection systems, weapons, training and tactics. Air search and attack capabilities apparently are extremely limited outside of coastal waters--i.e., 200 to 300 n.m.

3. Soviet Capability to Interfere with US Missile Range Activity

a. The Radio Interference Monitoring Group of the Atlantic Missile Range (AMR) reports there have been no significant instances of interference from Cuban sources. There have been instances of the US Range inadvertently using frequencies assigned to Cuba and vice-versa, but all such instances have been quickly corrected, and in the opinion of the AMR there have been no instances of deliberate interference.

b. Cuba is suitably located for monitoring US missile tests at Cape Canaveral, especially those in excess of 500 n.m. range. These, together with all space operations, are exposed to electronic observation from Cuba in their critical pre-burnout phases. From almost any place on the northern shore of central Cuba, there exists a line of sight to all missiles fired from Cape Canaveral after they reach 100,000 ft. altitude. For example, an Atlas missile has been exposed to the Cuban horizon for about three minutes by the time it reaches its critical shut-down phases at an altitude of 910,000 ft.

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4. Purpose of the Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

a. The USSR is maintaining a substantial military presence in Cuba for a variety of military and political reasons.

b. This continuing military presence reflects the USSR's deep commitment of prestige to protect Cuba from external efforts to undermine and destroy the Castro regime. The Soviet leaders are anxious to avoid any appearance of a decline in their support for Castro. They feel obliged to demonstrate their determination to secure his regime against US pressures. Furthermore, Khrushchev strongly desires to avoid any impression that he might be induced to make further retreats on such vital issues as Berlin by another display of US firmness.

c. The Soviet leaders also place a high value on their position in Cuba as a demonstration of their equality with the US as a great power and their ability to respond to the chain of bases which the US has established around the periphery of the Soviet bloc by developing a strong military presence in an area traditionally within the US sphere of influence. They also believe that failure or inability of the US to overthrow a Communist-supported revolutionary regime in the Western Hemisphere will in the long run weaken US prestige and influence in Latin America as well as in the world at large.

d. In addition to these considerations bearing primarily on the USSR's posture vis-a-vis the US, the Soviet leaders probably have felt since the October crisis that any substantial reduction or complete withdrawal of their military personnel and equipment in Cuba would seriously aggravate their already strained relations with Castro. The Cubans were not consulted on Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the strategic missiles and they almost certainly resisted the removal of the IL-28's. They would bitterly oppose any Soviet decision to withdraw the SAMs, MIG-21s, KOMAR boats, and other advanced equipment.

e. Aside from these requirements of deterring external intervention and managing a difficult political relationship with the Castro government, the Soviets may believe that maintaining a substantial military presence will provide them with effective leverage to influence Castro's policies. They probably have been irritated by his unwillingness to support the USSR in its conflict with the Chinese Communists

and his clearly expressed sympathy for Peiping's more militant, revolutionary line. The presence of Soviet forces could also enable Moscow to support Castro in suppressing any popular uprising and, possibly, to intervene decisively in any internal Cuban leadership struggle.

f. The possibility cannot be excluded, of course, that the USSR wishes to maintain a military presence so as to retain the option, at some more propitious point in the future, of taking action to foreclose US surveillance of Cuba or of proceeding with other activities which might be a direct threat to the US.

5. Restrictions on Publication. A restriction on "publication" of information on offensive weapons in Cuba was put into effect on 31 August, after the presence of defensive surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. A formal control system was instituted on 12 October. By "publication" is meant the use of such information in formal intelligence publications, which are widely circulated within the government through classified channels; these restrictions did not affect either the study and evaluation of incoming information by analysts or the dissemination of their findings to key policy-makers.

6. Differences in dates on charts. The Intelligence Community maintains a continuous running count both on Soviet military equipment and on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The figures presented on the two charts were chosen for particular illustrative purposes. The equipment chart was designed to show the extent of build-up; the dates 1 July (before the build-up), 1 November (the peak of the build-up), and 1 February (the present) were selected. The personnel chart was designed to show the evolution of our personnel estimates over the period in relation to statements on specific dates by government officials. More dates were required for this purpose: 1 July (before the build-up); 1 August and 1 September (our initial assessments of personnel arrivals); 19 September (date of the National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba); 22 October (date of the President's speech); 1 December (date by which we had reassessed our information on the peak build-up); 15 December (date by which we had made a detailed assessment of those remaining after the withdrawals); and 1 February (the present).

Questions Posed by Congressman Mahon

1. Are Soviet efforts in space, for military or peaceful uses? (Coord OSI)
2. a. Are the Soviets building killer submarines? (Coord OSI)
b. Have the Soviets developed an air-launched anti-submarine missile? (Coord ORR)
3. a. Is there any evidence that the Soviets in Cuba have been or could "use electronics to interfere with US missile or space flights on the Atlantic Missile Range"? (Coord OSI)
b. In this make a complete statement on why the Soviets are in Cuba. (Coord ONE) use Stennis 112
4. Date that the restriction was placed on information concerning offensive weapons in Cuba. (RL will handle)

Senator Saltonstall. I would like to just ask this one or perhaps two questions: How does the CIA assess the reason for continuing the Soviet combat units in Cuba. Is it to suppress Cuban insurrection and rebellion? Is it to repel any attempted invasion or is it to serve as a tripwire or direct confrontation with the U.S. and Soviet Union on any U.S. action concerning Cuba or to aid in the exportation of subversion and infiltration.

You passed on that partly yesterday. But why is it that they are keeping their 17,000 men in Cuba, in your opinion?

Mr. McCone. You can only express a view on that, because we don't know, but one obvious reason might be to make it very costly for us to invade Cuba and hence destroy a Communist base in the western hemisphere.

Another reason might be concern over Castro's stability and his continual adherence to the Communist cause and to keep a knife at his back.

A final reason might be to maintain a type of military establishment that would, could, at any time foreclose our surveillance of Cuba and to permit them to proceed with other types of activities which might be a direct threat against the United States.

SECRET

ESTIMATE AS OF DATE LISTED OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CUBA (EXCLUSIVE OF CIVILIANS)

- 1 JULY '62 500
- 1 AUG. '62 AT LEAST 2,000 *
- 1 SEPT. '62 " " 2,300 *
- 19 SEPT. '62 ABOUT 4,000 *
- 22 OCT. '62 8,000-10,000 **
- 1 DEC. '62 15,000-22,000
(PRESENT AT HEIGHT OF BUILDUP)
- 15 DEC. '62 17,000
(PRES. AFTER DEPART. OF MISSILE & BMBR)
- 1 FEB. '63

17,000

* AGREED INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ESTIMATES BASED ON KNOWN NORMAL PASSENGER CAPACITY OF SHIPS. DURING AUGUST THE DCI REPORTED 4-6,000.

** RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS SHOWS
22,000 PRESENT AT THIS TIME

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SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

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	1 JULY 1962	1 NOVEMBER 1962	1 FEBRUARY 1963
MRBMS	0	42	0
TANKS	160	345	395
FIELD ARTILLERY & AT GUNS	720	1,320	1,320
AAA GUNS	560	710	710
FROG ROCKETS	0	24-32	24-32
MILITARY VEHICLES	3,800	2,500-10,000	2,500-10,000
SAM SITES	0	24	24
SAM MISSILES	0	500	500
CRUISE MISSILE SITES	0	4	4
CRUISE MISSILES	0	150	150
AIR DEFENSE RADARS	0	ABOUT 160	ABOUT 200
JET FIGHTERS	35	101	104
JET LIGHT BOMBERS	0	42	0
HELICOPTERS	24	ABOUT 70	ABOUT 85-100
KOMAR CRUISE MISSILE BOATS	0	12	12

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4 FEB. 1963

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